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Interview
RE-EXAMINING THE RED RIVER:INTERVIEW WITH GARY
DILLARD JOINER
Jewett, Leah Wood
Summer 2003

An instructor of history and director of the Red River Regional Studies
Center at Louisiana State University in Shreveport, Gary Dillard Joiner is also
the founder of Precision Cartographics. He serves as a member of the U. S. Civil
War Center's On-Site Advisory Board. He is the President of the Friends of the
Mansfield Battlefield, a preservation organization dedicated to saving the
battlefields of the Red River Campaign. Joiner is past president of the North
Louisiana Civil War Roundtable. In addition to being a Louisiana and Civil War
historian, he is a professional cartographer. Among other projects, Joiner
creates geographic information systems for the Civil War Preservation Trust in
Washington, D.C. Gary Joiner's latest book is One Damn Blunder From
Beginning to End: The Red River Campaign of 1864 (Scholarly Resources).
Re-examining the Red River
Interviewed by Leah Wood Jewett
Civil War Book Review (CWBR): How did the Red River campaign
initially capture your interest?
Gary Dillard Joiner (GDJ): I have been interested in the Civil War since
childhood. My scholarly pursuits led me to Civil War navies and also to the
Trans-Mississippi region. The two were combined in the Red River Campaign of
1864. In 1994 the late Dr. Eddie Vetter, a professor at Centenary College in
Shreveport, and I wrote an article on the Union navy in the Red River Campaign
for the journal Civil War Regiments. This article became the kernel of both my
dissertation and One Damn Blunder From Beginning to End.
CWBR: How has your expertise in the fields of history, archology,
geography, and cartography affected your approach to this topic?
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GDJ: The Red River valley in Louisiana is a difficult place to examine a
Civil War campaign. The river has moved constantly from the first European
settlement to the creation of the J. Bennett Johnston Waterway navigation system
in the 1980s and 1990s. Documents from the Civil War often describe
geographic landmarks which little resemble features today or describe places no
longer on the Red River. The key to ground truthing the campaign is the use of
maps from Union and Confederate cartographers, modern topographic maps,
examination of archological site forms from the State of Louisiana, and, of
course, reading through volumes of reports and messages in the Official Records
of the War of the Rebellion. I use all of these tools to examine the campaign. I
have had great success using this technique in other places, particularly at
Vicksburg while mapping the Vicksburg National Military Park and surrounding
areas for the National Park Service. Whether working on relatively obscure
campaigns or well-documented battles, an inter-disciplinary approach is best.
CWBR: Current critics of the war against Iraq argue that oil is the
underlying reason for the conflict. What role did economics in general û and
cotton in particular û play in the federal decision to execute the Red River
campaign?
GDJ: The Red River Campaign was driven almost entirely by economics
and politics. The military objectives, although touted early in the war by
President Lincoln, General George McClellan, General Henry Halleck, and
others, were secondary. Many of New England's textile (cotton) mills were idled
due to lack of the fiber and over 28,000 workers were out of work. The Red
River Valley was called the Upper Cotton Kingdom. It was among the most
fertile cotton growing areas in the world. This alone made it a high priority
economic target. Also to be considered was the upcoming presidential race in the
fall of 1864. President Lincoln had a strong potential contender in Nathaniel P.
Banks. Banks, who led the campaign, was very popular in New England. A
native son of Massachusetts, Banks was a former three-term governor and
former Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives. He understood cotton,
textile mills, and the needs of his wealthy benefactors. Added to this mix of
priorities was the misunderstanding by President Lincoln that the German
immigrant hill farmers in Texas would revolt against the Confederate
government and mount a counterrevolution if they received Federal assistance.
CWBR: What role did engineering play?
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GDJ: The role of both Union and Confederate engineers was vital in the
conduct of the campaign. The Confederates prepared massive fortifications and
traps at several points along the river culminating in layered defenses in and near
Shreveport. The most ingenious system was located just south of Shreveport at a
place called Tone's Bayou. The Confederates diverted 75% of the water from the
Red River into Bayou Pierre and almost trapped the Union fleet. Admiral David
D. Porter, commanding the Union naval effort, was at a loss for an explanation
of the river's behavior. The fleet was not saved by naval efforts, but by a
Wisconsin lumberman, Colonel Joseph Bailey. Bailey's Dam, actually a series of
structures, raised the water level enough for the vessels to float and pass into the
safe portions of the channel below Alexandria. Col. Bailey was awarded the
Medal of Honor for his efforts. At the end of the campaign, Bailey again saved
the army by creating a bridge of steamboats lashed side by side to allow the
cavalry, artillery, and finally the infantry to cross the Atchafalaya River into the
safety of Union held territory.
CWBR: What did the outcome of the campaign mean for Northern war
strategy? Southern morale?
GDJ: The campaign had a definite effect on Northern plans in that 10,000
troops detached from General Sherman were not able to join him in the Atlanta
Campaign or the March to the Sea. They were sent to Tennessee where they
were pivotal in the final battles in that state. The XIX Corps was sent to
Washington to bolster the defenses and arrived in time to fend off Confederate
raids and then to participate in General Sheridan's Shenandoah Valley
Campaign. The Red River Campaign briefly revived Southern morale. General
Richard Taylor, the true Confederate hero of the campaign was given the official
thanks of the Confederate Congress. Taylor captured enough supplies from the
retreating Union column to equip his small army for the remainder of the war.
CWBR: How valuable is Richard Taylor's
Reconstruction to understanding the campaign?

Destruction

and

GDJ: Taylor's Destruction and Reconstruction ranks as one of the best
autobiographies penned from either side in the war. He is certainly colorful at
times and blunt in his opinions, but he is generally fair. Always eloquent, he
describes the Department of the Trans-Mississippi as he saw it. His utter dislike
of his department commander, Lt. General E. Kirby Smith, is plainly evident,
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and at one point he calls him that hydrocephalus in Shreveport. Taylor also
displays his contempt for Banks, having fought him both in Virginia and in
Louisiana. Taylor's account adds a tremendous amount of information to that
found in the Official Records of the War of the Rebellion.
CWBR: You mention in your introduction that the Union's failure here
led to the neglect of this chapter of Civil War history. To what else do you
attribute the lack of literature on the subject?
GDJ: The winners always write the history, at least the most widely
disseminated versions. The campaign was such an embarrassment to the Union
effort in 1864 that most leaders chose not to write of their achievements. Indeed,
there were few. Admiral Porter wrote two lengthy accounts of the campaign
following the war. Beginning with his official reports and then the two books,
each version was more embellished. Individual soldiers published diaries and
books or gave speeches to veterans' organizations, but that was the extent on the
northern side. Other than Taylor's book, few works came from the campaign on
the Southern side. Little was published for the general public until 1958. The
simple fact was that the campaign was a sideshow rather than a primary conflict
designed to end the war quickly. That alone makes the campaign more difficult
to research and understand, but it also makes it intriguing.
CWBR: What is the legacy of the Red River campaign? Why is it
important that we give it a second look?
GDJ: The campaign's legacy rests more in what it did not do. Nathaniel
Banks did not achieve his battlefield glory and was humiliated. Therefore, his
bid for the Republican candidacy in 1864 fizzled. Before the campaign, he was
arguably more popular than Lincoln, particularly in New England. Sherman's
10,000 did not join him in Georgia or the Carolinas. This may have lengthened
the war by weeks. Taylor and his Confederates stopped the grand invasion of
Texas and the capture of Shreveport, but they failed to capture or destroy the
bulk of the inland or brown water navy. This may have tipped the balance of
power along the Mississippi for an extended period of time and drawn forces
from the east to re-conquer the great river. A particularly long-lasting result was
the fact that northern Louisiana, almost all of Texas, and southwestern Arkansas
did not receive the ravages of fighting. With the infrastructure intact,
Reconstruction was particularly harsh in these areas and the ex-Confederates
became the hard-core conservatives that led the Jim Crow movement. The
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Colfax Riot and the Coushatta Massacre were direct responses to
post-Confederate attitudes over harsh Reconstruction.
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